China’s Expanding Role in African Peace and Security: A Systematic Review with a Nigeria Case Study and Implications for International Security

Abstract

Background. China has shifted from a largely economic partner of African states to a multifaceted security actor, with consequences for peacekeeping, strategic competition and global security governance. Objective. This PRISMA 2020-guided systematic review, with particular attention to Nigeria, asks (RQ1) how the literature characterises the nature, drivers and instruments of China's engagement in African peace and security; (RQ2) what evidence shows about its scale and direction; and (RQ3) what the implications are for international security. Methods. Records were identified through keyword searches built from three concept blocks (China, Africa, and security), publisher-platform searches and citation chaining, then screened against explicit eligibility rules, including a verifiable DOI. Sixty-two studies published between 2009 and 2026 were coded by theme, case and instrument, and combined with indicators from United Nations (UN), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) sources. Two lenses, securitisation of overseas interests and norm evolution, were applied to seven cases. Findings. (1) The literature has grown quickly since 2016 but is uneven: 22 of the 62 studies concern peacekeeping, only 4 address arms, private security and cyber-security combined, and only 1 is devoted to China–Nigeria security cooperation. (2) China's engagement widened from UN peacekeeping to naval escorts (2008), the evacuation of about 35,000 citizens from Libya (2011), a base in Djibouti (2017), and arms and training. (3) UN peacekeeping personnel fell from a peak of 3,084 (2015) to 1,862 (June 2025), while China's share of Africa's major-arms imports rose from 9.8 per cent (2018–2022) to 18 per cent (2020–2024). (4) The 2024 FOCAC plan commits RMB 1 billion in military grants and training for 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police. (5) In Nigeria, China has engaged without any peacekeeping role, supplying armoured vehicles, tanks, patrol boats, aid and training, and signing a 2025 agreement to localise ammunition production; the dedicated study finds limited alignment with Nigeria's insecurity priorities, and Nigeria pursues self-reliance. (6) Securitisation of overseas interests explains where China acts (Libya, the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti, Nigeria), while norm evolution explains how it behaves inside UN missions (Darfur, South Sudan, Mali); together they indicate an interest-led, norm-framed approach. (7) The literature divides into contributor, interest-protector, critical, African-agency and competition readings, each partly supported by the cases. (8) Evidence on civilian-protection outcomes and African agency is thin compared with evidence on motives and institutions. Conclusions and implications. For international security, the findings point to a gradual reshaping of peacekeeping norms, competition at key maritime and logistical nodes, and governance gaps in arms, private security and cyberspace. Recommendations, with timeframes and indicators, are offered for African institutions (including Nigeria), China, the UN, external partners, researchers and funders.